Business Presentation: "First Price Auction with Three Bidders Affected by Information"
Wednesday, February 19, 2014 at 1:00pm
De La Salle, Room 300 - Capalbo Room 4513 Manhattan College Pkwy., Bronx, NY 10471
This presentation studies First Price Auction with three bidders when the bidders gain information about the other bidders' valuation. If bidders have two possible valuations and independently and privately learn the others' valuation with some probability, there are twelve different types of bidders who are affected by information. In equilibrium, low value bidders bid their true value regardless of their information, while the high value bidders, except the informed ones who face two low value bidders, randomize over the bid interval following some bid distributions. This paper characterizes the equilibria and derives exact solution for equilibrium bidding behaviors parameterized by degree of information.
Three passport points will be awarded for attendance. Refreshments will be served.
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